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Abstract—Multi-core CPUs are a standard component in many
modern embedded systems. Their virtualisation extensions enable
the isolation of services, and gain popularity to implement mixed-
criticality or otherwise split systems. We present Jailhouse, a
Linux-based, OS-agnostic partitioning hypervisor that uses novel
architectural approaches to combine Linux, a powerful general-
purpose system, with strictly isolated special-purpose components.
Our design goals favour simplicity over features, establish a
minimal code base, and minimise hypervisor activity.
Direct assignment of hardware to guests, together with a
deferred initialisation scheme, offloads any complex hardware
handling and bootstrapping issues from the hypervisor to the
general purpose OS. The hypervisor establishes isolated domains
that directly access physical resources without the need for
emulation or paravirtualisation. This retains, with negligible
system overhead, Linux’s feature-richness in uncritical parts,
while frugal safety and real-time critical workloads execute in
isolated, safe domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the omnipresence of multi-core CPUs, manufacturers
of safety critical and uncritical products still tend to split com-
ponents with different levels of criticality to separate hardware
units. In such traditional mixed criticality environments, single
logical control tasks are strongly bound to dedicated physical
control units. Typical representatives of this architectural
approach range from automotive, where it is not uncommon
that a single car contains dozens to a hundred of different
control units [4], to industrial Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), where critical logical control tasks are executed on a
different physical computing platform than uncritical Human
Machine Interfaces (HMIs). Consolidating such systems to
single hardware units is an architectural trend [4] that does not
only improve the maintainability of substantial and growing
amount of software, but also reduces the overall hardware
costs.
CPU virtualisation extensions can be exploited to create
execution environments that ease the port of existing legacy
payload applications into strictly isolated execution domains
that cannot interfere with each other in an unacceptable way.
Our approach relies on these widely available techniques
to statically partition hardware while reducing architecture
dependencies.
The Linux-based hypervisor Jailhouse, initially developed
by one of the authors (JK) and subsequently refined as open-
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source software,1 is at the core of our architecture. It transforms
symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) systems into asymmetric
multiprocessing (AMP) systems by inserting “virtual barriers”
to the system and the I/O bus. From a hardware point of view,
the system bus is still shared, while software is jailed in cells
from where the guest software, so-called inmates, can only
reach a subset of physical hardware.
Jailhouse is enabled by a kernel module from within a fully
booted Linux system, see Figure 1. It takes control over all
hardware resources, reassigns them back to Linux according
to a configuration of the system, and lifts Linux into the state
of a virtual machine (VM). The hypervisor core of Jailhouse
acts as Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). This scheme does
not fit into the traditional classification of hypervisors [8] – it
can be seen as a mixture of Type-1 and Type-2 hypervisors: It
runs on raw hardware like a bare-metal hypervisor without an
underlying system level, but still cannot operate without Linux
as a system aide to provide initialised hardware. Linux is used
as bootloader, but not for operation. Unlike other real-time
partitioning approaches (e.g., PikeOS [10]) that aim to manage
hardware resources and may forbid direct access by guest
systems, Jailhouse only supports direct hardware access. Instead
of using complex and time-consuming (para-)virtualisation [2]
schemes to emulate device drivers and share physical hardware
resources, Jailhouse follows an exokernel-like approach [7]
in that it only provides isolation (by exploiting virtualisation
extensions) but intentionally neither provides a scheduler nor
virtual CPUs. Only (few) resources that can, depending on
the hardware support, not yet be partitioned in that way are
virtualised in software.
For cost effectiveness, many industrial applications cannot
give up on the capabilities and feature-richness of Linux in their
systems, yet they face increasing demands to simultaneously
cope with safety or other certification requirements that are
difficult to achieve with Linux. Our architectural approach
fulfils these needs. However, we consider it also an ideal
framework to ease the integration of state-of-the art research or
experimental systems that solve a specific problem in a novel
way with industry-grade solutions based on Linux.
In this paper, we present:
• The architecture of Jailhouse, a fully functioning, non-
scheduling, real-time, statically partitioning, and open-
source hypervisor running on several architectures.
1Available at https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse under GPLv2.
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Figure 1. Activation sequence of the Jailhouse hypervisor. After Linux has loaded and started the hypervisor, an additional real-time operating system is
started in an isolated critical domain.
• The implementation of a non-trivial real-world mixed-
criticality application running as a Jailhouse guest.
• Advantages of deferred hypervisor activation.
• A quintessential microbenchmark of the interrupt system
on an Nvidia Jetson TK1
II. RELATED WORK
Embedded virtualisation substantially differs from common
enterprise, desktop or mainframe virtualisation [9], where the
technology has its roots. Many segments consider the consoli-
dation of services as major motivation. While hypervisors are
often optimised for high throughput and optimal performance
in the desktop and enterprise segment, virtualisation solutions
for real-time constrained embedded systems especially target
low latencies, deterministic computation cycles and maintaining
real-time capabilities [9, 10, 15, 20, 24].
Nevertheless, many embedded hypervisors adopt established
practices from classical virtualisation: overcommitting of
hardware, paravirtualisation [2] or emulation of devices, and
guest scheduling.
Crespo et al. present the XtratuM [5] embedded hypervisor.
Their approach focuses on design constraints given by avionic
guidelines and specifications. With memory management, clock
and timer management, interrupt management, a feature-rich
hypercall interface and an own scheduler, XtratuM is a full-
fledged hypervisor.
The PikeOS [10] real-time separation kernel approach allows
for executing different guest environments or native tasks. For
running guest operating systems, PikeOS uses paravirtualisation
and hardware-assisted virtualisation, but also allows direct
I/O access. To payload applications, PikeOS incorporates a
combination of time- and priority driven scheduling, and use
best effort scheduling for uncritical tasks.
To implement temporal and spatial isolation, hypervisors
do not always require the availability of all virtualisation
extensions. Pinto et al. [16] show an interesting approach
by exploiting the ARM TrustZone technology to run a real-
time operating system in parallel to Linux on a single CPU.
Their approach maintains real-time capabilities by using fast
interrupts (FIQs) only for real-time critical devices. In contrast
to regular IRQs, those interrupts arrive directly in the secure
world, where the real-time operating system and the hypervisor
execute. Normal interrupts arrive in the non-secure world,
which is isolated from the secure world. This approach only
isolates the non-secure from the secure world, and not vice
versa. Additionally, the TrustZone approach only allows for
the creation of two domains.
Quest-V [12] is an advancement of the Quest operating
system and similar to Jailhouse in several respects. It aims for
static hardware partitioning with minimum monitor activity.
In contrast to Quest-V, Jailhouse is a VMM only, and does
not implement any device drivers which drastically minimises
its code base. Quest-V relies on paravirtualisation schemes to
boot Linux kernel as guest.
Jailhouse, in contrast to all those systems, starts with Linux
(and exploits its capabilities to initialize most of the hardware)
and then uses deferred (or late) hypervisor activation [18] to
partition the hardware underneath the already running Linux.2
III. STATIC HARDWARE PARTITIONING
A. Jailhouse Philosophy
As is shown in Figure 1, activating the Jailhouse VMM is
done with the assistance of a Linux kernel module containing
the hypervisor (HV). After the HV startup code is executed by
each CPU, Linux continues to run as a virtual machine and
guest of Jailhouse, the so-called root cell.
The myriad of existing different hardware makes it hard or
even impossible for research groups with limited resources
to support them in their systems. Linux, on the contrary, is
an extremely powerful operating system concerning hardware
support. Jailhouse takes this advantage and hijacks Linux. The
untypical deferred activation procedure of the VMM has the
considerable practical advantage that the majority of hardware
initialisation is fully offloaded to Linux, and Jailhouse can
entirely concentrate on managing virtualisation extensions.
Similar to the exo-kernel [7] approach, Jailhouse is an exo-
hypervisor, with the difference that the skeleton is modeled
by the corpus, and not vice versa. The direct assignment of
hardware devices allows Linux for continuing executing as
before. Unlike other partitioning approaches (for instance, [12]),
Jailhouse does not require any specific device drivers except
for minimalist, optional debug helpers.
Jailhouse assumes that physical hardware resources do not
need to be shared across guests. To create additional domains
(called non-root cells), Jailhouse removes hardware resources
(e.g., CPU(s), memory, PCI or MMIO devices) from Linux and
reassigns them to the new domain. Therefore Linux releases
2To the best of our knowledge, Rutkowska [18] was the first who used this
technique to inject undetectable malware (i.e., a thin hypervisor) into computer
systems.
the hardware if it has previously been in use. This includes
physical CPUs: the configuration of a partition consists at
least of one CPU and a certain amount of memory that is
preloaded by the root cell with a secondary operating system
or a bare-metal application.
Linux offlines selected CPUs and calls the hypervisor to
create a new cell by providing a cell configuration that describes
the assigned resources. Other resources, like PCI devices,
memory-mapped devices or I/O ports, can be exclusively
reassigned to the new guest as well. The hypervisor prevents
subsequent access to those resources from any other domain,
which prohibits inadvertent modifications. Non-root cells can
dynamically be created, destroyed (i.e., resources are assigned
back to the root cell) or relaunched.
Virtualisation extensions (See Ref. [1, 19, 21] for the four
major architectures ARMv7 with Virtualization Extensions
(VE), ARMv8, Intel 64-bit x86 with VT-x and VT-d support,
and amd64 with SVM support) guarantee spatial isolation: any
access violation, for instance illegal access across partitions,
traps [17] the hypervisor, which eventually stops execution.
Certain instructions executed by guests cause traps and must
be handled by the hypervisor.
Since Jailhouse only remaps and reassigns resources, the
ideal design conception is that – besides management – it
does not need to be active after setting up and starting all
guests, and only intercepts in case of access violations: “Look
Mum, no VM Exits!” However, hardware is not (yet) perfectly
suited for this approach, so on current hardware, the following
circumstances still require intervention by the VMM:
• Interrupt reinjection (depending on the architecture, inter-
rupts may not directly arrive at guests)
• Interception of non-virtualisable hardware resources
(e.g., parts of the Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) on
ARM)
• Access of platform specifics (e.g., accessing Control
Coprocessor CP15 or Power State Control Interface (PSCI)
on ARM)
• Emulation of certain instructions (e.g., cpuid on x86)
The following traps are unavoidable, and not contrary to
our concept, as they only occur in case of jailbreak or cell
management:
• Access violations (memory, I/O ports)
• Cell management (e.g., creating, starting, stopping or
destroying cells)
These interceptions introduce overhead and latencies – vir-
tualisation, of course, comes at a cost [6]. In section IV
we exemplarily present the evaluation of one fundamental
microbenchmark, the additional latency of interrupts.
Despite the strict segregation of resources across guests,
Jailhouse still allows cells to share share physical pages. Besides
enabling inter-cell communication, the mechanism also allows
for sharing memory-mapped I/O pages, which, if desired, allows
for accessing hardware resources from within multiple domains.
Such concurrent access is, however, not arbitrated by Jailhouse
and needs to be addressed appropriately by the guests.
Figure 2. Concept of ideal hardware partitioning: while the system bus is still
shared, the Jailhouse hypervisor takes care that cells only access resources
within their scope (colored). Safe communication between domains is enabled
by shared memory.
Figure 2 shows a possible partitioned system layout for
three cells: the Linux root cell (green), an additional Linux
non-root cell (blue) and a minimalist real-time operating system
(red). Communication between cells is realised by shared
memory regions, together with a signalling interface. This
minimalist design requires no additional device driver logic
in the hypervisor. Depending on the hardware support, it is
implemented based on a virtual PCI device through Message-
Signaled Interrupts (MSI-X) or legacy interrupts. A guest may
use this device to implement a virtual ethernet device on top
of it. On systems without PCI support, Jailhouse emulates a
generic and simple PCI host controller. We chose emulation
in this case, as PCI provides a configuration space: The PCI
device identifies itself and its capabilities. This enables, if
supported, automatic configuration in guests, and the virtual
PCI host controller results in only six lines of code and does
not increase the overall code size3.
B. Support
The partitioning approach allows a safety-certified operating
system or a bare-metal application to run on a consolidated
multi-core system in parallel to Linux. It is worth mentioning
that despite the fact that Jailhouse supports four different
CPU architectures, which goes beyond what is provided by
many experimental or research systems, its minimalist approach
results in only a few thousands lines of code for the core parts.
This simplifies certification processes, but allows developers
to concentrate on important issues without spending time on
providing a never complete number of device drivers that are
required to make the system usable in realistic environments.
The simplicity of the core is a good basis for a formal
verification of the hypervisor, similar to the formal verification
of related system software [11].
Jailhouse comes with its own inmate library that allows
for running minimalistic demo applications. Several operating
systems apart from Linux are already available as Jailhouse
3https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse/commit/
7b9f373dcfc14a4951928c43ded9c02b9f1ac02c
guests (L4 Fiasco.OC on x86 [3], FreeRTOS on ARM, Erika
Enterprise RTOS v3 on ARM64). We have successfully
ported the RTEMS real-time operating system for the ARM
architecture with very limited effort – modifications are mostly
required for platform specific board support. The simplicity
of porting systems suggests an opportunity to expose feature-
incomplete research approaches to realistic industrial use-cases
by combining them with an industrial grade base.
C. Practicability
To demonstrate the suitability of our approach especially
for practical use, we implemented a (mixed-criticality) multi-
copter control system. The requirements on such platforms are
comparable to many common industrial appliances: The flight
stack, a safety and real-time critical part of the system with
high reliability requirements, is responsible for balancing and
navigating the aircraft. Sensor values must be sampled at high
data rates, processed, and eventually be used to control rotors.
For a safe and reliable mission, the control loop must respond
deterministically. System crashes may result in real crashes
with severe consequences.
The flight stack runs in a Jailhouse cell, while uncritical
tasks, for example WiFi communication with a ground station
or camera tracking, can easily be implemented in an uncritical
part thanks to the available Linux software ecosystem. Critical
hardware components, e.g., SPI, I2C or GPIO devices, are
assigned to the critical cell. Our hardware platform is an
Nvidia Jetson TK1 with a quad-core Cortex-A15 ARMv7 CPU,
connected to a sensor board that provides accelerometers, GPS,
compasses and gyroscopes. Two cores are assigned to the
uncritical part, and two cores to the critical one.
The critical domain executes a second stripped-down Linux
operating system with the Preempt_RT real-time kernel exten-
sion. Ardupilot provides flight control, and does not require
modifications besides board support. This underlines that
existing applications can be deployed in a Jailhouse setup with
little effort, and that it is suitable for implementing real-time
safety critical systems mostly based on existing components.
Nonetheless, we needed to solve various issues that do not
arise on a purely conceptual level or with systems tailored for
very specific hardware, but endanger assumptions made in our
and similar approaches.
IV. EVALUATION
As mentioned before, the aim of Jailhouse is to minimise
the activity of the hypervisor. Though this would be possible in
theory, the sole existence of a hypervisor introduces additional
latencies [6] that do not exist without a VMM. For example,
shadow page tables may introduce additional memory access
latencies.
To evaluate and determine the (real-time) performance of
the hypervisor, several environmental conditions must be
considered. It is hard or even impossible to quantify the
hypervisor overhead with one single scalar. This results in
a set of microbenchmarks.
For all benchmarks, single-shot measurements do not allow
to draw any conclusions on the behaviour of the system. Mi-
crobenchmarks should be repeated under certain environmental
conditions, such as the actual existence of a hypervisor, and the
particular frequency of a certain measurement together with
the utilisation of other guests.
Due to the limited size of the paper, we will exemplarily
present the measurement of the interrupt latency in detail, and
describe other considerable measurements.
It is important to remark that such benchmarks do not
measure the overhead of the hypervisor, but the overhead of the
hypervisor when running on a specific hardware platform. Still,
those measurements allow to derive a trend of the performance
of the hypervisor.
a) Hypercalls: One typical benchmark for hypervisors
is the cost of hypercalls. In case of Jailhouse, hypercalls do
not need to be considered, as they are only used for cell
management purposes, and never occur in hot paths.
b) Shared System Bus: Different guests asynchronously
access memory, and memory or I/O access may be serialised
by hardware. Though starvation does not occur on supported
architectures, heavy utilisation of memory or I/O busses may
lead to significant slow downs of guests. While this problem is
well-known for SMP applications, its impact must be evaluated
when asynchronously executing multiple payloads that were
designed for single-core platforms.
c) Architecture-dependent Traps: Because of architectural
limitations, Jailhouse needs to emulate devices that are essential
for a hardware platform and that cannot be virtualised in
hardware (e.g., the interrupt distributor as part of the generic
interrupt controller on ARM architectures). Depending on the
utilisation of those devices, the impact of the hypervisor must
be analysed.
d) Interrupt Latency: Jailhouse supports two versions of
ARM’s Generic Interrupt Controller, GICv2 and GICv3 [13, 14].
Both implementations share the same architectural limitation:
Interrupts do not directly arrive at the guest. They arrive at
the hypervisor, and are then reinjected as virtual IRQs to the
guest. This leads to an overhead in the hypervisor, as it must
redirect the interrupt to the appropriate guest, followed by a
switch of the privilege level.
Our automated measurement setup consists of an Nvidia
Jetson TK1 (quad-core Cortex-A15 @2.32GHz) as target
platform, and an Arduino Uno for performing the actual
measurement.
To measure this latency, we compare the bare-metal latency
(i.e., the minimum latency without hypervisor) with the latency
when the hypervisor is present. The Arduino periodically
toggles a GPIO pin on the target board which causes an
interrupt. The only task of the non-root cell is to answer as soon
as possible to the interrupt by toggling another GPIO. Therefore,
we implemented a minimalistic guest that uses Jailhouse’s own
inmate library. To minimise code size for the response to make
it as fast as possible, the instructions for toggling the GPIO are
directly written in assembler in the interrupt vector table. The
measurement without hypervisor represents the bare minimum
Table I
INTERRUPT LATENCY ON AN NVIDIA JETSON TK1 (IN µS)
VMM Freq Stress µ σ Max
off 10Hz no 0.45 0.02 0.50
off 50Hz no 0.45 0.02 0.50
on 10Hz no 1.26 0.07 2.81
on 50Hz no 1.25 0.04 2.94
on 10Hz yes 1.36 0.34 5.56
on 50Hz yes 1.35 0.34 5.38
latency achievable by the selected hardware platform. Latency
difference with and without hypervisor presence measures
the delay that is introduced when the hypervisor and other
guests asynchronously access the system bus. The Capture
Compare Unit of the Uno ensures a precise measurement at
a resolution of 62.5ns. To validate measurements, we verified
sample measurements with the latency manually measured by
an oscilloscope.
We repeat the measurement under several conditions (e.g.,
load is placed on other guests to measure the influence on the
shared system bus) and present the arithmetic mean as well
as the standard deviation and the maximum latency. Every
measurement runs for four hours, and was repeated with an
interrupt frequency of 10Hz and 50Hz to determine the role
of the frequency of the measurement. The stress parameter in
Table I describes if other guests are put under CPU, I/O or
memory load with the stress-ng benchmark.
Results can be found in Table I. The first two lines show
the minimum interrupt latency of the measurement without
the existence of the hypervisor. The difference to other
measurements denotes the overhead that is introduces by the
hypervisor.
The latency that is introduced by the hypervisor does not
significantly depend on the interrupt frequency, but on the
utilisation of neighbouring guests. This effect is caused by the
shared system bus: The hypervisor wants to access memory
that is required for dispatching the interrupt, while other guests
asynchronously access the same bus.
On average, interrupt latency amounts to ≈ 810ns, with
narrow deviation. Still, outliers lead to latencies of almost 5µs.
Compared to the cycle times of typical industrial communica-
tion bus systems, the maximum delay is acceptable for many
applications.
V. DISCUSSION
The minimalist design approach of Jailhouse results in a
manageable amount of source lines of code (SLOC). This is a
crucial factor for both, formal verification from an academic
point of view and system certification from an industrial point
of view.4
4We are aware of the problem that a substantial chain of software besides
the Linux kernel (e.g., UEFI firmware code, bootloaders etc.) is required for
the boot process, and needs to be considered in such certifications to some
extent. There are various possible approaches to address these issues that will
be discussed in future work.
Jailhouse, in total, consists of almost 30k SLOC for four
different architectures. This includes the hypervisor core,
example code, kernel driver, and userland tools and utilities.
Substantial parts of the code are architecture-independent.
The common critical hypervisor core code that is shared
across all architectures amounts to less than 3.4k SLOC.
Architecture dependent code amounts to ≈7.4k SLOC for
x86 and implements both, Intel and AMD, and ≈5.4k SLOC
for ARM (both, ARMv7 and ARMv8). Exemplarily, the whole
hypervisor core for ARMv7 sums up to ≈7.4k SLOC.
Many research systems are developed from scratch and spend
tremendous effort on re-implementing existing device drivers.
But still, missing device support is a major obstacle for their
practicability. More than half of Quest-V’s source lines of code
(≈70k SLOC of 140k SLOC) implement device drivers. With
almost 27k SLOC, XtratuM is more lightweight than Quest-V
and only implements basic drivers for debug output. Still, the
publicly available versions of Quest-V and XtratuM currently
only support the x86 architecture.
Jailhouse does intentionally not follow classical virtualisation
approaches, but its design does not generally eliminate the
use of those techniques. This opens the possibility to exploit
Jailhouse as an experimental systems platform that allows for
keeping focus on the actual problem instead of re-implementing
fundamentals from scratch. Jailhouse is an ideal platform
for investigating hardware and software behaviour under
AMP workloads. Furthermore, it provides a convenient and
comfortable environment for executing digital signal processing
(DSP)-like workloads on raw hardware.
Modern multi-core systems already provide enough physical
CPUs to make scheduling in hypervisors unnecessary for many
real-world embedded use cases. In fact, numerous essential
requirements on real-time embedded hypervisors [5], such
as real-time scheduling policies, efficient context switches,
or deterministic hypervisor calls, do not even need to be
addressed in a partitioned setup. Those requirements actually
reflect well-known issues of operating systems and should
not be duplicated in hypervisor space for embedded systems
with real-time requirements. As Jailhouse does not virtualise
CPUs, overcommit hardware or schedule partitions, there are no
expensive partition context switches or scheduling issues [23]
as they occur in other real-time hypervisors [10, 15, 16, 24].
Hypercalls are only used for management purposes and not
for moderating access to shared hardware.
Depending on the interrupt system and the architecture,
interrupts might arrive at the hypervisor. On such platforms, the
interrupt reinjection to guests is a frequent job of the hypervisor
that introduces unintended additional interrupt latencies. This
issue is already solved for 64-bit x86 architectures that support
Interrupt Remapping and will be solved in future ARM
architectures that implement the GICv4 [14] specification,
which is beneficial to our final goal, to end up in no VM
exits.
Nevertheless, there are unavoidable traps that are caused by
hardware design. On current ARM architectures, the interrupt
distributor must be virtualised. Varanasi and Heiser [22] assume
that this is not expected to cause performance issues. During the
implementation of our demonstration platform we contrariwise
observed that Linux kernels with the Preempt_RT real-time
patch make heavy use of the interrupt distributor which causes
high activity of the hypervisor. Such issues should be addressed
by proper hardware design in order to be able to execute
unmodified guests,
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The static partitioning hypervisor technique is a promising
approach for embedded real-time virtualisation, as their ultimate
goal to minimise the interaction with guests defers all issues that
are introduced by typical paravirtualisation approaches back to
the operating systems of the guests, where they already existed
before. The driverless approach tries to fill the gap between
academic research systems and industrial practicability.
In comparison to paravirtualisation techniques, direct hard-
ware assignment to guests allows for running unmodified
legacy payload applications with no active hypervisor overhead.
The minimalist hypervisor core simplifies certification efforts.
By executing standard operating systems as guests, we also
minimised the effort that is required for porting existing legacy
payload applications. By implementing a complex demonstra-
tion platform, we successfully showed the practicability of
hardware partitioning.
While standard virtualisation extensions provided by current
hardware seem to suffice for a straight forward implementation
of our and many other approaches, real hardware presents a
number of limitations that can completely undermine the ad-
vantages and guarantees of partitioning and virtualisation-based
approaches. Our future work will address arising issues and
concentrate on evaluating the performance of the hypervisor.
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